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Abstract
This paper investigates strategic entrepreneurial choice between the UK Big 3 platforms–
Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom–that exemplify the three main equity crowdfund-
ing (ECF) shareholder structures identified in the literature. ECF has become a strategic 
choice for both entrepreneurs and angel and venture capital funds as it offers mutually 
beneficial advantages to both, especially under the co-investment ECF model where 
these funds co-invest alongside the crowd. The multinomial probit results show that large 
founder teams are more likely to choose the co-investment model (SyndicateRoom) but 
are less likely to opt for the nominee ownership structure (Seedrs). Although less hetero-
geneous teams are more likely to choose the Seedrs and Crowdcube ownership structures, 
our results suggest that the probability of choosing the co-investment model (Syndicate-
Room) monotonically increases as teams become more heterogeneous. The conclusion is 
that larger and heterogeneous teams are more likely to raise ECF funds from campaigns 
explicitly involving professional investors.
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1 Introduction
Young startups and ventures can raise outside equity from a variety of sources in the entre-
preneurial finance market (see Cassar, 2004; Cooper et  al, 1994; Schwienbacher, 2013). 
The traditional sources include business angel (BA), venture capital (VC), and private 
equity (PE) investors. Over the past decade, equity crowdfunding (ECF) has emerged as a 
novel source of outside equity in an effort to democratize entrepreneurial finance (Kleinert 
& Mochkabadi, 2021). It may have the advantage of being stable and resilient in period 
of crisis (Cumming et al, 2021), and was initially provided by a geographically dispersed 
crowd of mainly non-accredited investors who exhibit heterogeneity in their investments 
(Hornuf et al., 2021). In this context, ECF has been viewed by some as an equity funding 
mode of last resort for discouraged entrepreneurs based on a pecking order view of outside 
finance (Walthoff-Borm et al., 2018a). The implication of this view is that the platform’s 
main role is to act as gatekeepers to mitigate adverse selection problems and thus protect 
the crowd. The above study analyses early (2012–15) campaigns in the UK when the pure 
ECF model (where institutional investment was absent/ minimal) still prevailed. For exam-
ple, Zhang et al. (2018) find that the share of accredited institutional investors such as BA 
and VC in UK ECF was a mere 8% in 2015. However, with the rise of co-investment in 
ECF campaigns, their share rose to 25% in 2016 and to 49% in 2017 and levelled off at 
around 50% since (Zhang et al., 2018). This level of institutional involvement in ECF casts 
doubt on the notion of ECF as equity funding of last resort in the post-2016 period.
In this context, other researchers argue that ECF may be a strategic or first choice rather 
than a last resort for startups (Cummings et al., 2020; Junge et al., 2021; Stevenson et al., 
2021). Stevenson et al. (2021) focus on the concept of entrepreneurs as strategic fund seek-
ers rather than as startups striving to satisfy the criteria of traditional funders like BA or 
VC. They argue that strategic entrepreneurs seek “funding fit” by choosing ECF for rea-
sons that highlight new forms of nonfinancial value. We complement that by pointing to 
the attractions of ECF campaigns for entrepreneurs. ECF enables them to raise BA/VC 
funding more cheaply as the latter co-invest at the share price agreed with the platform and 
platform fees are lower than BA or VC syndicate fees. Traditional BA or VC funders as 
sole funders use their positions as monopoly providers and to lowball the purchase price 
for their stakes and also enjoy power vis-à-vis the entrepreneur in the aftermath of their 
stakes. This is a very important value consideration that is not discussed in the Stevenson 
et al. (2021) study.
This paper adopts the view of entrepreneurs as strategic fund seekers but in the context 
of the highly developed ECF market in the UK. This market has two distinctive features. 
The first is that this has been a predominantly coinvestment ECF market since 2016 (Zhang 
et  al., 2018). BA, VC, PE and other early stage investors such as family offices widely 
invest in ECF campaigns and often pre-commit funds prior to campaigns going public. 
Coinvestment has attractions for both traditional investors and for the startups. On the one 
hand, BA and VC funds can diversify their investments across a wider number of startups 
by making smaller but still significant contributions to a larger number of ECF campaigns. 
On the other, these smaller equity stakes imply that entrepreneurs are less subject to direct 
control by such investors than in the traditional BA or VC stakes (except for the Syndi-
cateRoom co-investment model–see below). Moreover, BA or VC stakes provide certifica-
tion effects that attract more crowd investors (Ralcheva & Roosenboom, 2016). This paper 
complements and extends their study by highlighting value and control considerations in 
funding fit choice in the context of the UK ECF market.
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The second feature of the UK market is its very distinctive ownership structures embed-
ded within ECF platforms that provide a wide choice to strategic entrepreneurs seek-
ing outside equity. Cumming, Vanacker and Zahra (2019c) highlight that ECF platforms 
embrace the three shareholder structures that are adopted by the Big 3 UK ECF platforms. 
The first is the direct ownership scheme pioneered by Crowdcube–the UK’s largest ECF 
platform—since 2011 where the investors are the legal and beneficial owners. The sec-
ond or nominee account model introduced by Seedrs in 2012 is one where the platform as 
legal owner acts on behalf of all the investors who are the beneficial owners. The nominee 
model involves an active post-campaign corporate governance role for the platform (Coak-
ley et al., 2021a). The third ECF model is the co-investment or lead investor model pio-
neered by SyndicateRoom in 2014. Here the lead investor conducts due diligence, commits 
25–40% of the target capital prior to the campaign going public and monitors the ECF firm 
in the wake of a successful campaign.1
Over time, the distinctions between platforms has lessened. Each of the platforms has 
adopted some of the features of their rivals. One notable feature formally adopted by all 
Big 3 platforms is the co-investment model or what is called private launch by Seedrs and 
Crowdcube.2 This is most developed in the case of SyndicateRoom where it is known as 
the lead investor model but elements of it were later adopted by the other two platforms. 
The significant difference is that due diligence is led by the professional investor. Thus, 
one can argue that the UK market has become a predominantly co-investment rather than a 
pure ECF market in that BA, VC, PE and other early stage investors such as family offices 
widely invest in ECF campaigns and often pre-commit funds prior to campaigns going 
public. Apart from the Zhang et  al. (2018) data referred to above, the British Business 
Angel Association estimate that approximately one third of all UK and 43% of London-
based business angels have co-invested on ECF platforms. These levels of co-investment 
based on thorough due diligence are clearly at odds with the view of ECF as equity of last 
resort. Rather they suggest that both ECF platforms and traditional equity providers are 
developing synergistic relationships in the seed and growth stage financing ecosystem.
The paper’s major contribution is that it analyses the details of strategic entrepreneurial 
choice among distinctive ECF platforms as their preferred outside equity option. Co-invest-
ment is key here as this step often precedes the public launch of UK initial ECF campaigns 
in recent years. On the one hand, it enables entrepreneurs to focus on the post-campaign 
shareholder structure they want for their startups as they transition to what Cumming et al. 
(2021) call the ECF firm, while on the other, they may strategically choose a platform to 
signal quality and increase the likelihood of campaign success. Thus, our paper comple-
ments the Stevenson et  al. (2021) study by analysing founder team choice among three 
competing platform structures employing a large quantitative dataset. The study employs 
data from 1291 (successful and unsuccessful) initial campaigns that have been conducted 
on Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom over the 2013–2018 period. It broadly follows 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) in quantifying founder (management) team characteristics 
and in highlighting team heterogeneity.3 They proxy management team resources by team 
1 SyndicateRoom ceased to be a crowdfunding platform in late 2019—see Coakley and Lazos (2021)
2 See https:// help. crowd cube. com/ hc/ en- us/ artic les/ 11500 11148 90- Your- Crowd cube- journ ey and https:// 
help- entre prene ur. seedrs. com/ en/ artic les/ 21273 14- is- my- campa ign- ready- for- priva te- launch
3 Note that they focus on the relation between management quality and Initial Public Offerings and docu-
ment a positive association between quality and IPO outcomes. Vismara (2018) notes that IPOs share com-
mon features with ECF campaigns.
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size and qualifications (e.g. holding an MBA) and team heterogeneity by average tenure 
and tenure heterogeneity. In addition, we employ proxies capturing age and nationality 
heterogeneity.
The results suggest that founder team size is negatively associated with the probability 
of choosing the Seedrs nominee model and with a significantly higher probability of choos-
ing the Syndicate Room co-investment model. One obvious attraction of Seedrs for solo 
founders and small teams is that the platform as nominee assumes responsibility for all 
corporate governance and related administrative tasks. Our results complement and lend 
support to the findings in Cumming et  al. (2019b) in which ownership structures are an 
important determinant of success.
The average marginal effects for team heterogeneity (tenure, nationality and age) are 
all positive and significant at the 1% level. They imply a higher probability of choosing 
the SyndicateRoom co-investment shareholder structure across all models, highlighting the 
role of a business angel as lead investor on this platform. By contrast, heterogeneous teams 
are less likely to pick the Seedrs nominee platform for their initial campaign. The clear 
implication is that larger and heterogeneous teams are more likely to raise ECF funds from 
campaigns explicitly involving professional investors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature 
and outlines the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 gives details of our data and empirical 
methodology. Section 4 discusses the results of multinomial probit analysis while the final 
section concludes.
2  Literature and hypotheses
This section provides first a brief summary of the UK ECF platform structures and then 
discusses existing literature findings. Finally, it formulates hypotheses that will be tested in 
the empirical section. It argues that founder team with specific characteristics may choose 
strategically a specific platform to signal startup quality.
2.1  UK ECF platform structures
There is a growing interest in the equity crowdfunding (ECF) literature in both corporate 
governance and competing platform shareholder structures. Studying them has become 
fundamental (Buttice & Vismara, 2021). Cumming, Vanacker and Zahra (2019c) highlight 
that ECF platforms embrace the three shareholder structures that are adopted by the Big 
3 UK ECF platforms. The first is the direct ownership scheme pioneered by Crowdcube 
– the UK’s largest ECF platform—since 2011. Here the platform’s post-campaign role as 
an intermediary is minimal and so the startup directly communicates with its investors who 
are the legal owners. The big attraction of this model is that the ECF shareholders enjoy 
direct (legal) ownership of the shares and their names appear on the share register. How-
ever, it also has downsides. One is that post-campaign corporate governance (e.g. decision 
making on a host of issues such as calling extraordinary meetings or decisions about fol-
low-on funding) can impose a heavy administrative burden especially in the case of large 
shareholder numbers. Another is the challenges of attracting large investments to provide 
ECF campaigns with traction in their early stages. This may have an impact on the type of 
investor it may attract in the future (Buttice et al., 2021).
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The second or nominee account model introduced by Seedrs in 2012 is one where the 
platform as legal owner acts on behalf of all the investors who are the beneficial owners. 
The nominee model involves an active post-campaign corporate governance. Coakley et al. 
(2021a) discuss the role of the nominee model and conceptualise it as having similarities 
with venture capital (VC) or business angel (BA) syndicates. However, both VC and BA 
syndicates are limited to qualified (professional and high net worth) investors. The latter 
have to pay fees of between 5 and 20% to the syndicate lead investor on AngelList and an 
additional 5% to the platform (Agrawal et  al., 2016). By contrast, Seedrs nominee cam-
paigns encourage the involvements of ordinary investors– the crowd–by granting them full 
voting and ownership rights and also involve low campaign fees.
The third ECF model is the co-investment or lead investor model pioneered by Syndi-
cateRoom in 2014. Its model resembles the BA syndicate in being open to qualified inves-
tors only but its campaign fees are similar to those of Seedrs and Crowdcube. Here the lead 
investor conducts due diligence as well as committing 25–40% of the target capital prior to 
the campaign going public. The SyndicateRoom model is closer to the VC/BA syndicate in 
that its campaigns are limited to qualified investors only, but it only charges a nominal fee 
for participating in a campaign.
2.2  Related literature
This paper links to a number of distinct literatures. The first and most central of these is 
the role of the founder team in young startups and ventures. While the central role of the 
founder team has not yet been widely investigated in the ECF context, it has received con-
siderable attention in later stage entrepreneurial financing. When a new firm is founded, 
one of the most important factors that provides the basis for its success is its founder team. 
The existing literature establishes that the founder team composition is possibly the most 
important factor for the long-term success of a firm (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
SØrensen and Stuart, 2000; Agarwal et al., 2020).
One interesting question in this literature is whether solo ventures outperform founder 
teams. In general, the results suggest that teams perform better than solo founders because 
of the wider set of skills they possess (Lazear, 2005; Levine et  al., 2017). One notable 
exception is the paper by Greenberg and Mollick (2018). They find that solo founders 
outperform founder teams in terms of survival and do no worse in terms of revenue gen-
eration using a sample reward-based crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter. However, 
since reward-based crowdfunding campaigns are generally less risky than ECF campaigns 
(Coakley and Lazos, 2021), it may not be possible to generalise these findings.
In this vein, Coakley et al., (2021c) examine whether solo founders are more likely than 
founder teams to succeed in an initial ECF campaign and subsequently are less likely to 
fail. The results for a large sample of initial ECF campaigns on the Crowdcube, Seedrs and 
SyndicateRoom platforms show that solo founders have a lower probability of conducting 
successful initial ECF offerings than founder teams and have a higher probability to fail in 
the long run. They conjecture that founder teams enjoy more success as their human capital 
quality may likely attract professional investors that can act as a certification effect. Moreo-
ver, the monitoring role of professional investors helps to minimise moral hazard concerns 
and lowers the probability of failure for founder teams. In contrast with their study, this 
one is based on a pre-campaign decision-making setting where teams choose shareholder 
structures (platforms) and extends the range of team characteristics. It also includes a con-
tinuous team size variable rather than a binary variable capturing founder team versus solo 
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founder firms, which also allows us to identify how small changes in the number of team 
members could potentially affect the strategic entrepreneurial choice between competing 
crowdfunding platforms.
This paper is also linked to a long-lasting debate (and literature) on whether manage-
ment team heterogeneity–sometimes also called diversity—positively or negatively affects 
the performance of publicly traded firms. The empirical results are mixed. On the one 
hand, one strand of the literature documents a negative effect of team heterogeneity on 
performance (Chrobot-Mason et al., 2009; Li & Hambrick, 2005). On the other, a different 
strand finds a positive effect on performance (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Murray, 1989). Jin 
et al. (2017) acknowledge the mixed results about diversity and argue that entrepreneurial 
teams are closely related to project teams in which there is a need for diversity. They con-
duct a meta-analysis study in an entrepreneurial setting and find that diversity positively 
affects venture performance.
The other literature to which our paper connects is that on ECF shareholder structures. 
A few studies have examined shareholder structures both within and across platforms. 
Cumming et  al. (2019b) employ data from the Crowdcube platform and their two stage 
Heckman results suggest that ownership and control separation from its dual class share 
structure lowers the likelihood of both short- and long-term success. Coakley et al. (2021a) 
investigate both the inter-platform and intra-platform impact of nominee versus direct own-
ership initial campaigns. They establish that nominee initial campaigns are more likely 
to succeed, raise more funds, and to attract overfunding relative to direct ownership cam-
paigns. They also find that nominee campaigns enjoy greater long run success in terms of 
successful seasoned equity crowdfunded offerings. Our study both complements this study 
and extends it by analysing the full range of platform shareholder structures available in the 
UK in a pre-campaign context.
Rossi et al. (2019) employ data from a sample of 185 platforms in Australia, Austria, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, the UK and the US. Their empirical find-
ings establish that the direct ownership approach has a negative effect on campaign suc-
cess while the nominee account approach has no significant effect in this regard. Walthoff-
Borm et al. (2018b) find that ECF firms which employ the nominee account realize lower 
losses. There has been less research on the co-investment shareholder structure model 
possibly because, as Rossi et al. (2019) point out, fewer campaigns have been conducted 
on co-investment or syndicate-like platforms. For this reason, it is important to include 
such a platform in our study. The importance of co-investment is highlighted in Wang et al. 
(2019) in which professional investors exchange information with the crowd which in turn 
may improve the efficiency of the ECF market.
2.3  Hypotheses
2.3.1  Team size
Co-investment. Signalling theory posits a direct association between signaller quality and 
signal effectiveness (Spence, 1973). Existing ECF literature suggest that founder teams are 
high quality signallers who are able to send effective signals that reduce information asym-
metry. As a result, they are more likely to conduct successful offerings (Ahlers et al, 2015; 
Vismara, 2016). Thus, large size teams may choose strategically to raise capital via the 
co-investment model to strengthen further their signal of quality via the presence of profes-
sional investor (Ralcheva and Rossenboom 2016). Moreover, it is easier for them to comply 
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with and satisfy professional investor due diligence. Solo founders for example, are less 
attractive for Angels and Venture Capitalists (Graham, 2006). This leads to the following 
hypothesis:
H1A Founder team size is positively associated with the probability of choosing the (Syn-
dicateRoom) co-investment shareholder structure.
Nominee Solo founders and small founder teams are the least well equipped to cope 
with the post-initial campaign administrative burden associated good corporate govern-
ance especially when they have raised outside equity involving an ECF direct ownership 
campaign. For this reason, there are good grounds for leading one to presuppose that will 
choose a nominee platform structure (e.g. Seedrs platform) that will assume this adminis-
trative burden on their behalf if the campaign is successful. This is further supported by 
findings in Rossi and Vismara (2018) in which post-campaign services matter for cam-
paign outcomes. Conversely, the size of the founder team is expected to be inversely asso-
ciated with the nominee shareholder structure as larger teams can more readily share the 
administrative tasks.
H1B  Founder team size is inversely associated with the probability of choosing the 
(Seedrs) nominee shareholder structure.
2.3.2  Team heterogeneity
A strand in the literature focuses on whether the founder (management) team matters most 
in professional investor investment criteria. A recent study by Gompers et al. (2020) argues 
that the management team is the most important criterion in selecting investments based on 
responses to a survey of 885 institutional venture capitalists (VCs) across 681 firms. Even 
though results are mixed about the association between heterogeneity–sometimes called 
diversity—and team performance, a meta-analysis study by Jin et al. (2017) concludes that 
diversity positively affects venture performance. This suggests a positive relation between 
heterogeneity and team quality.
There is evidence in ECF firms backed by a professional investor are less likely to fail 
(Signori & Vismara, 2018). Most investments in startups take place via a professional 
investor network (Gompers et  al., 2020). Heterogeneous teams consist of members from 
different cohorts and so they are more likely to have large networks that can be multi-ben-
eficial (Wood et al, 2019). Networks matter for ECF success as well (Vismara, 2016). On 
the one hand, heterogeneity reflects quality in the startup ecosystem while, on the other, it 
is more likely for heterogeneous team to be part of a professional investor network. This 
makes it more likely for heterogeneous teams to choose strategically–and pass the profes-
sional investor due diligence step—to raise capital via the co-investment model in order to 
signal quality. This suggests the following hypothesis:
H2 Founder team heterogeneity is associated with a higher probability of choosing the 
(SyndicateRoom) coinvestment shareholder structure.
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2.3.3  Team advanced education and experience
Management literature suggests that advanced education and experience are key factors 
in founder team human capital. The general consensus is that highly educated and experi-
enced teams perform well compared to their less skilled and experienced counterparts. In 
other words, they represent high quality signallers who are able to send effective signals to 
investors and raise capital successfully. Existing evidence suggest that experience is one 
of the most important selection criteria for VCs (Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). Education 
matters for the involvement of professional investors especially in the technology sector 
(Levie and Gimmon, 2008) which dominates ECF (Coakley et al., 2021b). In other words, 
founders with these characteristics are more likely to meet professional investor investment 
criteria.
Experience and education play a very important role in entrepreneurial finance. The 
empirical studies of Barbi and Mattioli (2019) and Piva and Rossi-Lamastra (2018) show 
that this holds in ECF campaigns also. They argue that past experience and educational 
level are the most salient team human capital elements in this respect. This is particularly 
likely to be the case for startups engaged in complex (e.g. bio-sciences or technology) pro-
jects that may benefit from professional investor advice as on the SyndicateRoom platform. 
As a result, experienced and highly educated teams may choose strategically the co-invest-
ment platform to strength signal quality. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H3 Founder team experience and advanced education are associated with a higher prob-
ability of choosing the (SyndicateRoom) co-investment shareholder structure.
3  Data and methodology
3.1  Data
Our empirical results are based on a sample of successful and unsuccessful ECF campaigns 
launched on the three major platforms of the UK (Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom) 
covering the period 2013–2018. The data end in 2018 as SyndicateRoom changed from 
being a crowdfunding platform to become a fund management firm specialising in startups 
in 2019. This study obtains ECF data from TAB, which has been used in previous ECF 
studies (Ralcheva & Roosenboom, 2019). The unique registration number for UK firms 
is used to match TAB data with founder data from the UK Companies House. We follow 
a similar approach as in Coakley et al. (2021b) and identify a founding team member to 
be the one listed as Director on the UK Companies House website. We remove Seasoned 
Equity crowdfunded offerings. This results in a dataset that consist of 1291 initial ECF 
campaigns.
3.2  Empirical specifications
In investigating the effect of founder team characteristics such as team size and heteroge-
neity on ECF platform choice, we conjecture that strategic founder teams may opt out for 
one of the three main shareholder structures that platforms offer in the UK ECF market: 
Crowdcube, Seedrs or SyndicateRoom. This type of decision-making process leads us to 
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model platform choice by employing a multinomial probit (MNP) regression. The MNP 
model is used with discrete dependent variables that take on more than two outcomes that 
do not have a natural ordering (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).
Based on our analytical framework, we can assume firm i’s utility for choosing platform 
j, Uij(i = 1,… , n;j = 1, 2, 3) is a function of team, firm-level and campaign characteristics 
and a stochastic error. The utility of choosing ECF platform j is:
where xij is a vector of covariates and the errors are assumed to be normally distributed, 




 . The probability that platform j is chosen is
where yi is a random variable that indicates the choice made. The MNP model is an exten-
sion of the binary probit model that allows the coefficients of the explanatory variables to 
vary across the choices and allow us to assess whether team size and founder team hetero-
geneity characteristics are associated with higher probabilities of choosing a specific plat-
form by firms. Since we are not interested in the coefficients of the multinomial model per 
se but rather in the change in the probability associated to changes in team characteristics, 
the results are presented in terms of average marginal effects (AME).4
3.3  Variables
In the multinomial framework, the dependent has three outcomes associated with each 
particular platform shareholder structure: Crowdcube (direct ownership model), Seedrs 
(nominee model) and SyndicatedRoom (co-investment model). In the direct ownership 
model on Crowdcube, the investors become the direct owners of the shares although only 
a small proportion of the owners—typically those with large investments—enjoy voting 
rights leading to a wedge between ownership and control rights.5 In our sample, startup 
firms can choose between any of these platforms to launch their initial ECF campaigns. We 
conceptualize their choice as a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 3: (1) Crowdcube, 
(2) Seedrs and (3) SyndicatedRoom. The key independent variables used in the empirical 
model relate to team size, team heterogeneity and firm and campaign level characteristics.
A set of control variables is used to account for unobserved heterogeneity relying on the 
findings of existing studies. They are firm (pre-money) valuation, start-up status, headquar-
ters location based on a London dummy, diversification across sectors, technology dummy 
capturing whether the firm operates in the Technology Hardware & Equipment sector, tar-
get capital, equity offered and year dummies. Errors are clustered at the industry level as in 
Hornuf et al. (2018). It also accounts for investor preference in specific industry groups as 
evidence suggest in Johan and Zhang (2021).














4  Table  11 in the appendix provides results based on Marginal Effects at the Means (MEM), changes 
between maximum and minimum values and changes in terms of standard deviations. The main results 
reported in Sect. 4 remain unchanged.
5 See Cumming et al., (2019a, 2019b, 2019c) for an interesting discussion of these issues and their implica-
tions.
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4  Empirical results
This section first reports basic descriptive statistics for our sample of 1291 startups over 
the 2013–2018 period. It then proceeds to present and discuss the key results of our multi-
variate empirical analysis on the effect of founder team characteristics on the probability of 
startups choosing one of the Big 3 UK platforms to launch their initial campaigns.
4.1  Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the definitions of the variables employed in the empirical analysis.
The key variables of interest include four measures of team heterogeneity: team size, 
tenure, nationality and age heterogeneity following Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). Note 
that team size is a continuous variables, which encompasses the Greenberg and Mollick 
(2018) distinction between solo ventures (team size = 1) and founder teams (team size > 1). 
Other variables of interest include experienced team (dummy equal to 1 for above median 
founder team age) and advanced degree.6
Table 2 presents the basic descriptive statistics for all variables.
The average founder team size in our sample has 2.34 members. Crowdcube campaigns 
account for 60% of our sample, Seedrs for 29%, and SyndicateRoom for 12%. The average 
team tenure and age heterogeneity are 1.2 and 9.2 years, respectively. Around 28% of cam-
paigns are conducted by firms that include at least one non-UK founding team member. 
By construction, half our sample is formed by an experienced team (i.e. average team age 
exceeds the sample median team age of 43). Only 7% of firms have at least one founder 
team member that holds a Doctor or Professor title. The average pre-money valuation of 
startups in our sample is £3.17 m and 79% of them are less than 5 years old (startups). 
The sample firms are geographically concentrated with 46% located in London. Some 48% 
of firms operate in the Technology sector and are mainly undiversified (i.e. with a strong 
focus on a single sector). The average target capital is £0.32  m and the average equity 
offered is around 14%.
Before conducting a multivariate analysis, we test for the presence of multicollinearity 
among the variables by reporting the values of their correlation coefficients in Table 3.
The table shows that there are no high pairwise correlations between the variables, 
except for the case of correlations between team characteristics which is to be expected. 
For this reason and to avoid concerns of high correlations, we analyse team characteristics 
separately in the following sections.
Given the central importance of platforms within our analysis, we focus on the differ-
ences across the 3 platforms by performing multiple-sample multivariate tests on means 
under the null of equal means for all platforms. This yields a Wald chi-squared statistic. 
The results are reported in Table 4.
The test statistic overwhelmingly suggests statistically significant differences across 
platforms both in terms of team characteristics and firm-level variables. These results jus-
tify our focus on platforms and are consistent with existing studies that document platform 
effects in ECF (Rossi et al., 2019). There are two exceptions. The results indicate no sig-
nificant differences across platforms in terms of diversification and a focus on the Technol-
ogy sector.
6 Mincer (1974) follows a similar approach and employs age to proxy experience.
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4.2  Multivariate analysis
Tables 5 to 10 shows the average marginal effects (AME) from multinomial probit regres-
sions predicting the choice of a platform for launching an ECF campaign) by founder teams 
in terms of size and heterogeneity. In each table, Model 1 excludes the control variables, 
Model 2 includes the control variables, and Model 3 includes the control variables plus 
year fixed effects. Looking at the model fit statistics, it is clear from all the Tables 5 to 10 
that both the log likelihood and  R2 increase as we move from Models 1 to 3, indicating a 
better fitting model. In other words, Model 3 demonstrates increased explanatory power 
over Model 1 in all cases. Both Models 2 and 3 have a lower Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) compared to Model 1, suggesting that fit is 
improved in both models after including control variables while statistical significance of 
our key independent variables remains largely unchanged.
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
This table reports the number of observations along with mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, 
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of variables employed in this study. The sample involves initial ECF offer-
ings conducted on Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom and spans the period from January 2013 to 
December 2018
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 Min Max
Platform choice
ECF platforms 1291 1.52 0.69 1 1 2 1 3
Crowdcube 1291 0.60 0.49 0 1 1 0 1
Seedrs 1291 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 0 1
SyndicateRoom 1291 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 0 1
Team characteristics
Team size 1288 2.34 1.42 1 2 3 1 11
Tenure heterogeneity 1288 1.20 2.46 0 0 1.36 0 26.42
Nationality heterogeneity 1288 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 0 1
Age heterogeneity 1288 9.19 11.49 0 3.8 15.09 0 64.88
Experienced team 1288 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 0 1
Advanced degree 1288 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 1
Firm-level characteristics
Firm valuation 1172 3.17 5.52 0.72 1.35 3.37 0.08 68.6
Startup 1291 0.79 0.41 1 1 1 0 1
London 1291 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 0 1
Diversification 1277 1.18 0.52 1 1 1 1 4
Technology 1289 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 0 1
Campaign characteristics
Target capital 1291 0.32 0.39 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.00 6.00
Equity offered 1232 14.12 8.26 8.94 12.5 18.42 0.08 67.75
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Table 5 presents the results using a continuous variable to measure team size.
The results reveal that the average marginal effect (AME) on founder team size is sig-
nificantly positive for SyndicateRoom but significantly negative for Seedrs, both at the 1% 
level. The positive value implies that larger teams are more likely to choose Syndicate-
Room and this supports H1A. By contrast, team size is inversely associated with the prob-
ability of choosing the (Seedrs) nominee structure in line with H1B. The implication is that 
smaller teams are more likely to launch their campaigns in Seedrs. Finally, the Crowdcube 
AME for team size is statistically insignificant indicating that team size does not matter 
for choosing Crowdcube (see Fig. 1 also). Instead, Table 5 indicates that firm valuation, 
equity offered and being a startup all have statistically positive impacts on the choice of 
Crowdcube.
An alternative way of exploring the relationship between team size and platform choice 
is by computing and plotting predicted probabilities as team size increases. These relation-
ships are depicted in Fig. 1.
Table 4  Descriptive statistics at platform level
This table shows descriptive statistics across equity crowdfunding platforms. We use the “mvtest means” 
test available on Stata 16.1 to perform a multiple-sample multivariate test on means under the null of equal 
means for each platform
***Significance at the 1% level
Crowdcube Seedrs SyndicateRoom (Wald 
chi-squared 
statistic)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Team characteristics
Team size 2.331 1.413 1.984 1.151 3.282 1.603 83.63***
Tenure heterogeneity 1.100 2.151 0.808 2.069 2.657 3.921 30.43***
Nationality heterogeneity 0.249 0.433 0.279 0.449 0.403 0.492 12.71***
Age heterogeneity 8.957 11.226 7.202 10.602 15.335 12.906 46.50***
Experienced team 0.501 0.500 0.401 0.491 0.738 0.441 58.24***
Advanced degree 0.052 0.222 0.038 0.191 0.282 0.451 40.61***
Firm-level characteristics
Firm valuation 3.499 6.425 2.477 4.275 3.433 3.306 11.72***
Startup 0.794 0.405 0.847 0.361 0.591 0.493 33.22***
London 0.430 0.495 0.548 0.498 0.356 0.480 21.41***
Diversification 1.190 0.533 1.144 0.474 1.184 0.562 2.11
Technology 0.488 0.500 0.454 0.499 0.544 0.500 3.49
Campaign characteristics
Target capital 0.313 0.345 0.258 0.444 0.537 0.434 44.81***
Equity offered 14.872 7.587 11.310 6.885 17.469 11.759 76.91***
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Figure  1 shows that, for the mean team size, the probability of choosing Crowdcube 
is just under 60% but its slope is close to zero, consistent with an insignificant AME in 
Table 5. By contrast, the probability of choosing Seedrs for the mean team size is around 
30%, and that for SyndicateRoom is only 10%. The probability of choosing Seedrs drops 
substantially as team size increases, portraying graphically this negative relationship pre-
sented in Table 5. Conversely, the probability of choosing SyndicateRoom increases mono-
tonically suggesting a clear and strong positive relationship. These two results lend further 
support to Hypotheses 1A and 1B.
The separate results for tenure and nationality heterogeneity are summarized in Tables 6 
and 7, respectively.
The AME coefficients capturing the team tenure and nationality heterogeneity are 
all positive and significant at the 1% level for the SyndicateRoom co-investment share-
holder structure across all models in both Tables 6 and 7. This supports H2. The impli-
cation is that heterogeneous teams are more likely to conduct their campaigns on a plat-
form that has a business angel as lead investor. This is consistent with the Jin et  al. 
(2017)’s meta-study in which diversity is positively associated with venture perfor-
mance. By contrast, the team tenure and nationality heterogeneity coefficients are sta-
tistically insignificant for both Crowdcube and Seedrs but those for firm valuation and 
equity offered are once again (as in Table 5) significantly positive for Crowdcube only.
We also examine the relation between the predicted probability of choosing a platform 
for specific values of founder team heterogeneity. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 where the 
vertical (horizontal) axis reports predicted platform probabilities (heterogeneity values).
Figure 2 shows an upward slope for SyndicateRoom (starting at around 0.15) reflecting 
a positive relation between tenure heterogeneity and the probability of choosing the co-
investment model. By contrast, the relationship for Seedrs exhibits a downward slope like 
that for Crowdcube. Crowdcube slope is roughly flat in line with the insignificant coefficient 
in Table 6. Seedrs exhibits lower probabilities for the same values of tenure heterogeneity 
Fig. 1  Analysis of the predicted probabilities of ECF platform choice by team size This figure shows pre-
dicted probabilities of ECF platform choice across team sizes (mean + 3 standard deviations) with 95% con-
fidence intervals based on the estimated full Model (3) in Table 5
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compared to Crowdcube. It is worth noting that teams with tenure heterogeneity of around 
5.5 years have the same predicted probability of choosing either SyndicateRoom or Seedrs.
The results for age heterogeneity are summarized in Table 8.
The results show that age heterogeneity exhibits a significantly positive AME for the 
SyndicateRoom platform while yielding corresponding significantly negative AME for 
the Seedrs platform, both at the 1% level. One can think of age heterogeneity as reflect-
ing the general experience of the founder team.
Figure 3 depicts the relation between the predicted probability of choosing a platform 
for specific values of founder team age heterogeneity.
The patterns are quite similar to those in Fig.  1. In line with previous results, Fig.  3 
shows an upward slope for SyndicateRoom reflecting a positive relation between team age 
heterogeneity and the probability of choosing the co-investment model.
Next, we focus on the relation between highly educated and experienced teams and 
the probability of choosing a specific platform structure to conduct their campaigns. The 
results are summarized in Tables 9 and 10 for teams for experienced teams and advanced 
degree, respectively.
The results suggest that experienced and highly educated teams are more likely to conduct 
their campaigns on the SyndicateRoom platform as their AMEs are positive and significant 
at the 1% level in both Tables 9 and 10. This supports our hypothesis H3. The Table 9 results 
also show that experienced teams are less likely to choose a nominee platform to raise capital 
but the advanced degree coefficient is insignificant in Model 3 in Table 10.
Our results so far lend support to and complement the findings of existing studies which 
document platform effects in the ECF market (Rossi et al., 2018). While their focus is on 
what happens during the campaign, our focus is on the pre-campaign stage decision. Our 
results may shed more light on digital corporate governance studies as well (Cumming 
Fig. 2  Analysis of the predicted probabilities of ECF platform choice by tenure heterogeneity This figure 
shows predicted probabilities of ECF platform choice across different levels of tenure heterogeneity (sam-
ple mean + 3 standard deviations) with 95% confidence intervals based on the estimated full Model (3) in 
Table 6
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et al, 2019b), as shown in the previous section findings where team characteristics matter 
during the ECF platform choice (and associated shareholder structure choice) stage.
It is worth noting that Crowdcube coefficient is insignificant in most of the cases. 
Crowdcube offers a dual shareholder structure. It started offering the direct scheme at its 
inception, it gave another option to entrepreneurs though by offering the nominee in Feb-
ruary 2015. Coakley et  al. (2021c) focus on the effect of nominee on ECF outcomes in 
the long and short run at inter and intra platform level. Their findings reveal that nominee 
offerings are more likely to be successful in the short and long run. Put differently nominee 
may be an effective signal that may reflect team quality. Given that Crowdcube offers both 
nominee and direct, this may help explain the insignificant coefficients on Crowdcube. A 
future intra-platform analysis may shed more light on this.
Our findings reveal that heterogeneous, highly educated and experienced teams are 
more likely to conduct campaigns on a platform that requires the commitment of profes-
sional investor.77 CCAF report that the share of ECF investment by institutional investors increased from 
just 8% in 2015 to 25% in 2016 and to 49% in 2017 and was around 50% in 2018. A possible explana-
tion may lie in the positive association between signaller quality and signal effectiveness 
(Connelly et al, 2011; Spence, 1973). Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) argue that later stage 
teams with these characteristics are high quality teams and have a positive effect on IPO 
outcomes. The commitment of a professional investor may be an effective signal for reduc-
ing information asymmetry in ECF (Ralcheva & Roosenboom, 2016). As a result, hetero-
geneous teams may be high quality signallers who may choose the co-investment platform 
to enhance signal quality for their startups.
Fig. 3  Analysis of the predicted probabilities of ECF platform choice by age heterogeneity This figure 
shows predicted probabilities of ECF platform choice across different levels of age heterogeneity (mean + 3 
standard deviations) with 95% confidence intervals based on the estimated full Model (3) in Table 8
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4.3  Robustness tests
To address the increase in co-investment in the final years of our sample, we restrict our sam-
ple to the 2016–2018 period and the summary results are presented in Table 12 while the cor-
responding summary results for the full sample period are given in Table 11. They provide 
further support for our main previous findings: larger and heterogenous firms are more likely 
to choose the co-investment ECF model to raise outside equity on ECF platforms. This is cor-
roborated by the fact that all of the SyndicateRoom marginal effects in Table 12 are signifi-
cantly positive at the 1% level with the exception of nationality heterogeneity.
However, there are now marked differences between the Crowdcube and Seedrs find-
ings for the two samples. Table 11 for the full sample confirms that the marginal effects 
for Seedrs were largely significantly negative whilst those for Crowdcube were mostly 
insignificant. Now by contrast, Table  12 reveals that the Crowdcube and Seedrs mar-
ginal effects are reversed. They are mostly significantly negative for the Crowdcube 
platform (excluding nationality heterogeneity) whilst those for Seedrs are now virtu-
ally all (excluding team size) insignificant. The implication is that as co-investment has 
increased, larger and more heterogeneous teams are less likely to choose the Crowdcube 
platform.
As a final robustness check, Table 13 in the Appendix include results of models includ-
ing all team characteristics simultaneously. The main results remain largely similar.
5  Conclusions and discussion
This study extends the existing ECF literature by examining strategic entrepreneurial 
choice among competing platform or shareholder structures. It employs firm and cam-
paign data from Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom for the period from January 2012 
to December 2018. The multinomial probit results suggest that larger and heterogenous 
founder teams are more likely to conduct campaigns on a platform that employs the co-
investment model. They lend support to the findings of Cumming et al. (2019b) and Rossi 
et al. (2019) in which platform shareholder structure matters in ECF. They are also in line 
with entrepreneurial studies in which founder team is possibly the most important factor 
when BA or VC funds choose to invest in a firm (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Sudek, 2006; 
Gompers et al., 2020).
The theoretical implication of our study is that founder team characteristics matter for 
platform selection. The main equity crowdfunding platforms in the UK are Crowdcube, 
Seedrs, Syndicate Room. Each has its individual characteristics including governance 
structures and campaign support. One of the main aspects to consider from a founder team 
perspective is whether it will want to use a platform that allows crowdfunding investors 
to hold shares directly or through a nominee structure. We try to shed light on this issue 
for the first time through a detailed empirical analysis of the ECF UK market, as the deci-
sion to launch a campaign on a specific platform will therefore have potential short- and 
long-term implications for the startup. As for practical implications, our study may help 
platforms improve their due diligence process. Due diligence plays a very important role 
for a sustainable crowdfunding market (Cumming et al, 2019a). In other words, our find-
ings may help platform filter out startups which are less likely to receive investments from 
professional investors. The latter account for half the investment in the UK ECF market 
(Zhang et  al, 2018) and they exchange information with inexperienced investors. This 
Strategic entrepreneurial choice between competing…
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improves the overall efficiency of the ECF market (Wang et al, 2019) and may help create a 
sustainable and flourishing ECF market.
Although this paper presents the first attempt empirically to study the implications of 
human capital on choosing a crowdfunding platform in the UK context, some of its limita-
tions offer the opportunity for further research. In the current paper, we only observe firms 
matched with ECF platforms, but we have no information about startups which are rejected 
by the platforms. Analysis of whether and how platforms and human capital interact during 
the pre- and post-campaign process will be useful for a more in-depth analysis in a context 
of a diverse ecosystem of ECF platforms and interplay among them. In addition, another 
direction for future study, could be to link market timing and founder characteristics in 
ECF. Cerpentier et  al. (2021) find that ECF firms set higher targets and as a result they 
raise more capital in hot markets compared to their counterparts in cold markets. Found-
ers choose specific shareholder structure to signal quality thus their decisions may differ 
between hot and cold markets. Future research may shed more light on this.
Appendix
See Tables 11, 12, 13.
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Table 11  Summary of key marginal effects for regression models for the full sample (2013—2018)
Average marginal effects (AME) are computed by averaging over the sample (i.e. changes are averaged 
across observed values). Marginal effects at the mean (MEM) are computed based on sample means of 
independent variables. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and ***
Crowdcube Seedrs SyndicateRoom
Team Size (Table 5)
Change by 1 − 0.003 − 0.043*** 0.046***
AME 0.002 − 0.043*** 0.041***
MEM 0.006 − 0.048*** 0.042***
Change over range (Min → Max) − 0.310*** − 0.341*** 0.652***
Change by the regressor’s standard deviation − 0.007 − 0.061*** 0.068***
Tenure heterogeneity (Table 6)
Change by 1 − 0.007 − 0.009 0.016***
AME − 0.006 − 0.009 0.015***
MEM − 0.006 − 0.009 0.015***
Change over range (Min → Max) − 0.398*** − 0.263*** 0.660***
Change by the regressor’s standard deviation − 0.019 − 0.022 0.041***
Nationality heterogeneity (Table 7)
Change from 0 to 1 − 0.061* − 0.017 0.078***
AME − 0.057 − 0.014 0.071***
MEM − 0.057 − 0.015 0.072***
Age heterogeneity (Table 8)
Change by 1 − 0.001 − 0.003*** 0.004***
AME − 0.001 − 0.003*** 0.004***
MEM − 0.001 − 0.003*** 0.004***
Change over range (Min → Max) − 0.164** − 0.182*** 0.346***
Change by the regressor’s standard deviation − 0.016 − 0.030*** 0.046***
Experienced team (Table 9)
Change from 0 to 1 − 0.022 − 0.071*** 0.093***
AME − 0.023 − 0.069*** 0.092***
MEM − 0.018 − 0.075*** 0.093***
Advanced degree (Table 10)
Change from 0 to 1 − 0.152* − 0.111*** 0.263***
AME − 0.091 − 0.085 0.176***
MEM − 0.089 − 0.093* 0.182***
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Table 12  Summary of key marginal effects for regression models for the restricted sample (2016–2018)
Average marginal effects (AME) are computed by averaging over the sample (i.e.changes are averaged 
across observed values). Marginal effects at the mean (MEM) are computed based on sample means of 
independent variables. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and ***
Crowdcube Seedrs SyndicateRoom
Team Size (Table 5)
Change by 1 − 0.022 − 0.022** 0.045***
AME − 0.019 − 0.021* 0.041***
MEM − 0.020 − 0.023* 0.042***
Change over range (Min → Max) − 0.370*** − 0.244*** 0.614***
Change by the regressor’s standard deviation − 0.034* − 0.033** 0.067***
Tenure heterogeneity (Table 6)
Change by 1 − 0.016** − 0.000 0.016***
AME − 0.015** − 0.000 0.016***
MEM − 0.016** − 0.000 0.016***
Change over range (Min → Max) − 0.469*** − 0.152* 0.620***
Change by the regressor’s standard deviation − 0.046** − 0.003 0.049***
Nationality heterogeneity (Table 7)
Change from 0 to 1 − 0.067* 0.026 0.041*
AME − 0.065* 0.026 0.040*
MEM − 0.070* 0.028 0.042*
Age heterogeneity (Table 8)
Change by 1 − 0.004*** 0.000 0.004***
AME − 0.004*** 0.000 0.004***
MEM − 0.005*** 0.001 0.004***
Change over range (Min → Max) − 0.233*** − 0.003 0.236***
Change by the regressor’s standard deviation − 0.052*** 0.003 0.049***
Experienced team (Table 9)
Change from 0 to 1 − 0.109*** − 0.012 0.122***
AME − 0.109*** − 0.012 0.121***
MEM − 0.115*** − 0.010 0.125***
Advanced degree (Table 10)
Change from 0 to 1 − 0.149** − 0.070 0.218***
AME − 0.112 − 0.049 0.161***
MEM − 0.120 − 0.052 0.172***
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